In regards again to T!m's comments regarding the need for perfect intelligence, Saddam's own generals believed they had WMD.
In regards to taking pre-emptive action without perfect intelligence, we live in a world where our opponents do not give us warning before striking. The Japanese did not warn us before Pearl Harbor. The North Koreans did not warn the UN before striking into South Korea. The North Vietnamese didn't warn the South Vietnamese before violating the Tet truce. Terrorists did not warn us before the attempt to blow up the USS Cole. Bin Laden did not warn us before attempts to blow up the twin towers. T!m, if you take your arguement to it's logical conclusion, it would mean that if we had good intelligence (but not perfect intelligence) that Bin Laden was planning 9/11 - and had put his plan into operation - we would not be justified in striking until we had perfect proof? And what would that concrete proof be - the first hijacking?
I think the problem that I see with your thinking on this is that you focus on the high cost and tragedy that is every life lost, and feel that this sort of cost requires a form of certitude in order to be justified, much like the absolute truth that is an algebriac proof.
However, while I respect the costs the loss of life represents, I believe that the nature of international relations has no certainty. When you are talking about the future actions of one group versus another, you can never be certain what course either group will take. In other words, when you talk about the future actions of a group of people, it is all hypothetical - with no gaurantees that they will act in a rational manner. And this can cause quite a dlemma for those governing, because the people being governed do not want another Pearl Harbor, nor a 9-11, and expect that those governing will act pre-emptively if there is a danger.
This brings me to Saddam and Iraq. I think that the administration made its principal mistake in focusing on whether or not Saddam had WMD. Whether or not he had active stores is ultimately, from a practical standpoint, irrellevant.
Contrary to public opinion, chemical and biological weapons are ridicously easy to develop. Take, for example, Sarin (also known as GB), which is one of the deadliest forms of nerve agents. The Aum Shinrikyo cult developed and released Sarin on subways in Japan in 1995 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin_gas_attack_on_the_Tokyo_subway). We are not talking about a soveriegn nation with a defense ministry, and state funded weapons programs. We are talking about a CULT! In another example, in 2004, insurgents in Iraq detonated an Improvised Explosive Device that included Sarin (where the Sarin came from, and whether it was scavenged from old Saddam stockpiles was unresolved, but it had to come from somewhere). Chile reportedly developed Sarin under Pinochet. Why is Sarin so easy to make? It is essentially a pesticide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin). In fact, the research that lead to it's development was focused on agricultural pesticides. Any nation that has an agricultural pesticide program can also develop Sarin.
The question in regards to WMD isn't whether a nation, including Saddam's Iraq, has them. The above examples show that any nation can have them, and if they currently do not have them, they can produce them in short order (hey - if the cult can..) The question is whether they will use them, and use them against us. We know that Saddam used Sarin against the Iranians in their war. He used them against the Kurds. Since the end of World War II, Saddam's Iraq is the only nation to actively use Sarin (and other agents) in a mass deployment. Not the old USSR, not Red China, nor any of the other Cold War bogeymen. Saddam. This makes him, in my mind, a heightened risk. Pre-invasion, we did know that a few things were certain:
Saddam knew how to make WMD.
Saddam had used WMD in the past.
Saddam would not allow definative searches of his facilities to alleviate our concerns (remember, he was doing the shell game with the facilities the UN was allowed to search).
We also knew that Saddam was under pressure to appear strong. This pressure was not from us, but from Iran, who was trying to influence events in the southern (Shia) areas of Iraq. Also, the climate had changed in the Arab world. Remember the Palestinians cheering in the streets after 9-11? If he chose to attack us, he could appear strong and a hero for Arabs.
The question then becomes which of two strategies do you pursue: containment, or active measures? Containment is usually pursued with rational actors, where both sides understand that there is great risk and loss if either side crosses "the line". Think of the US, USSR, and Mutually Assured Destruction. Saddam wasn't very rational. So do you leave someone out there with his history with WMD, and wait to see if perfect intelligence in the form of an attack that could make 9-11 look like patty-cakes occurs? Or do you mitigate risk, and take him down first?
Ultimately, this is the conundrum that faces any administration in the face of a threat that will give no advanced warning (I think advanced notice went out with the Crimean War). Very clearly, the Clinton administration - with the hindsight of 9-11 - should have used stronger military force against bin-Laden while he was in Sudan, and done what was necessary to kill or capture him. However, they didn't have the luxury of hindsite, and instead were content to lob a couple of cruise missles into the general area. In hindsite , they underestimated him.
Now place the same risk of underestimation against Saddam. Someone who feels cornered. And already knows how to make and use WMD.
Just to further the scenario, lets say we leave Saddam in power a little while longer, and he does something irrational (by our standards), like whip up some Sarin, and use it in a chain of attacks against US military installations in the Middle East. The attacks kill 8,500 service men and women (a reasonable assumption considering the numbers of service people stationed there). In making the calculation about whether to invade, this type of hypothetical can not be ruled out, especially from someone like Saddam. And also remember, any future estimations of his activities will all be hypotheticals. And if he does attack, there willbe no advanced warning.
I know it is a long post, but that is my reasoning for acting against Saddam - for me it is not about whether he had WMD. It is purely risk mitigation against a dangerous, unstable, irrational ruler.
