Is China Japan Circa 1989?

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Much of what I have warned about China is coming to fruition, and even Grant's Interest Rate Observer (a gold bug of all gold bugs) is warning of the demise of China, and their forced loose lending standards (Are they really that stupid? Did they not learn anything from us in our own stupidity of lending that was not forced?).



<a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/08/is-china-japan-circa-1989.html">Is China Japan Circa 1989?</a>



<em>It must be lonely being a China bear....particularly for those dubious about its longer term prospects, as opposed to those who might simply think its stock market is a bit ahead of itself even after its recent correction.



Vitaliy Katsenelson, in an article at MorningStar, beings almost sounding a tad persecuted before he warms up to his theme. that there is more in common between Japan in the late 1980s, when it seemed poised to continue its inexorable rise and China today. And the differences for the most part favor Japan. Katsenelson first quotes Jim Grant at length, then offers his own comments.



From Morningstar (hat tip reader Michael):



<blockquote> China today is where Japan was in the late ?80s, except with the greater political instability that comes with a semi-controlled economy and the lack of a social safety net (read: jobless, hungry people don?t write angry letters, they riot)...Today China projects to the world a similar image as Japan did in the 1980s...



Lately, the Chinese economy has been impressing us with its growth...But Chinese economic structure is not is not superior to the West?s; the Chinese can just cook GDP numbers better and control their economy more effectively through forced lending and spending.



However, these short-term advantages come with long-term consequences ? there will be a steep price to pay for them; there always is. I?ve written a lot about this (here and here). Instead I?ll quote James Grant, the publisher of Grant?s Interest Rate Observer. Jim is providing the latest issue of his newsletter free...Here are a few quotes ...:





?A superb primer on the risks of China?s go-for-broke lending drive was published by Fitch Ratings on May 20. Is it not passing strange, the agency asks, that Chinese lending is accelerating even as Chinese corporate profits are shrinking? ?Ordinarily, falling corporate earnings are met with tightened lending, but in China, precisely the reverse is evident. . . .? You would expect?and Fitch does anticipate?that the borrowers of these trillions of renminbi are not so profitable as they were in the boom, and some will therefore struggle to service their debts.?



I think this chart, also excerpted from Grant?s Interest Rate Observer, tells the full story of the quality of China?s latest growth...</blockquote></em>



http://contrarianedge.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/chinese12monthslending.jpg

<em>

Yves here. Hyman Minsky fans will recognize this as his Ponzi unit paradigm. Back to Grant via Morningstar:

<blockquote>

<strong>?Since 2005, China has generated 73% of the global growth in oil consumption and 77% of the global growth in coal consumption.?</strong> [emphasis is mine]</blockquote>




Yves here, I know extended quotes in blog posts can be a bit confusing. We are now done with Jim Grant and are back to Katsenelson in a second of two linked articles:



<blockquote>Today, Chinese economic growth is the force pushing the global economy. The quality of this growth, however, is low as it is predicated on massive (forced) lending and thus unsustainable. As Chinese growth slows, China will turn from a wind into sails of global economy to its anchor. The impact will be felt in many, often unsuspected places.



It will tank the commodity markets, commodity producers and commodity exporting nations. Let's take oil, for instance. As incremental demand from China collapses, oil prices will follow, taking the Russian economy with it, as Russia is for the most part a one-trick-petrochemical-pony. According to GavKal Research China accounts for 15% of Brazil's exports (up from 1.5% a decade ago), significantly impacting the economy of that South American nation..



Demand for industrial goods will fall off the cliff. China consumed a lot of those goods - $550 billion worth annually (also according to GaveKal Research). So if Caterpillar expects to sell more of its yellow earthmovers to China, it will have put that thought on hold for awhile.....



Finally, Chinese appetite for our fine currency will diminish, driving the dollar lower against the renminbi and boosting our interest rates higher. No more 5% mortgages and 6% car loans.



Identifying bubbles is a lot easier than timing them. An astute observer could have seen the Japanese bubble developing in 1986, 1987 and 1988, but he would have been "wrong" until 1989....</blockquote>




Yves again. The other reason to take this gloomy appraisal seriously is that in the Great Depression, it was the big exporter (the US) that faced the most difficult adjustment. Overconsuming indebted countries in Europe simply defaulted.</em>
 
lending in this way is proof that the chinese thinking and the obama thinking are alike -> spend your way out of a depression. don't economists often remind us that the great depression was washed away not by the new deal but by world war two (think of ww2 as massive govt spending via war bonds and artificial inflated employment and you'll see the analogy).



put simply, there is no other option for the chinese govt: they simply have too many mouths to feed to take the other option (tighten credit, reduce debt as percentage of GDP and strengthen balance sheet). if the importing countries (USA being biggest) is tightening their belts, what else can china do other than stuff money in its population's pockets and hope to create an internal consumption market quickly? for their sake, it'd better grow REALLY quickly or hundreds of millions will be out of work and then the shit really hits the fan. but if things go according to their plan, people will spend (remember china still has one of the highest savings rates in the world, something else the govt has to fight) more and keep the momentum despite dwindling exports.
 
btw, i do not agree china is japan circa 1989. (1) different points on the export/consumption curve, (2) drastically different demographics trends. i believe japan f**ked up in the 90s, when it had several paths ahead and chose the status quo over and over; while china has only one good option ahead of it and is following it.
 
The Economist has been predicting a bank blowup in China for years and so far the government's been able to keep it from happening. They have control over their economy that our own government would drool over.
 
I agree with Almon. It's impossible to draw more than cursory parallels between China and anyone else. China still has to make [MUCH] tougher decisions today than Japan had to at any point in the 80s. While that lending chart may look alarming, realize that they could fund it all with their US treasury holdings and possibly have enough left over to buy GE, WalMart and Exxon Mobil.



<blockquote>Today, Chinese economic growth is the force pushing the global economy. The quality of this growth, however, is low as it is predicated on massive (forced) lending and thus unsustainable. As Chinese growth slows, China will turn from a wind into sails of global economy to its anchor. The impact will be felt in many, often unsuspected places.



It will tank the commodity markets, commodity producers and commodity exporting nations. Let's take oil, for instance. As incremental demand from China collapses, oil prices will follow, taking the Russian economy with it, as Russia is for the most part a one-trick-petrochemical-pony. According to GavKal Research China accounts for 15% of Brazil's exports (up from 1.5% a decade ago), significantly impacting the economy of that South American nation..



Demand for industrial goods will fall off the cliff. China consumed a lot of those goods - $550 billion worth annually (also according to GaveKal Research). So if Caterpillar expects to sell more of its yellow earthmovers to China, it will have put that thought on hold for awhile.....



Finally, Chinese appetite for our fine currency will diminish, driving the dollar lower against the renminbi and boosting our interest rates higher. No more 5% mortgages and 6% car loans.</blockquote>
Blaming China for being a potential anchor to the global economy because their bubble might pop at some point in the future seems kind of silly. Does the author live in a glass house? If and when China does implode we should probably thank them for keeping things going as long as they did to soften the blow of everything else. If anything, higher interest rates and--if we're lucky--cheaper goods might get us through this hangover a little quicker.
 
Other perspective....



<a href="http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/08/22/conrad-black-much-ado-about-china.aspx">Conrad Black: Much ado about China</a>



Overblown announcements heralding the supposed coming of the Age of China have become a staple of journalistic futurism in recent years. When Maclean's magazine banners across the top of its cover "When China Rules the World," as it did last month -- and it is not a Monty Python send-up of swarms of incomprehensible people in Mao suits -- I know it is time to raise a peep of dissent.



Does any of this sound familiar? It was not even 20 years ago that the same was being said about Japan, when U. S. president George H. W. Bush went to Tokyo and was patronized by the Japanese prime minister for being at the head of a declining power. At an official dinner, the president vomited and returned to his embassy in an ambulance (but explained privately that his indigestion was the consequence of eating plain fish while facing Chrysler chairman Lee Iacocca for two hours).
 
Thought this was relevant.



Excerpt from <a href="http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-20/110227359.html">Andy Xie: New Bubble Threatens a V-Shaped Rebound</a>:



<blockquote>

If one accepts that the U.S. household savings rate will continue to rise, emerging economies must decrease their savings rates, increase investment, or decrease production. The best choice is to decrease savings rates. But savings rates are hard to change. They depend mainly on demographics and wealth levels. The quickest possible way out would involve creating an asset bubble that inflates household wealth and decreases savings. Many advocates of inflated property and stock markets in China have this effect in mind. Japan's bubble after the Plaza Accord in 1985 had its origin in the same dilemma. This approach, if it works, has catastrophic long-term consequences. Japan remains mired in stagnation two decades after its bubble began to burst.



Some analysts are expecting China to repeat Japan's bubble experience, which occurred in the late 1980s. At that time, Japan's export-led growth model was stymied by a doubling of its currency value after the Plaza Accord. It tolerated a massive asset bubble to stimulate domestic demand and stabilize its economy. China's export-led model is facing a rising savings rate and declining U.S. demand for its exports. Asset inflation could be a way out in the short term.



China doesn't need to repeat Japan's experience. One reason is that the circumstances are not the same. First, Japan was a developed country when its bubble started getting out of control in 1985. It couldn't divert its vast savings into infrastructure investment. But today, China's national urbanization project still has up to 30 percentage points to go. If the right mechanism can be implemented, China could divert more savings into urbanization.



Second, China can decrease its savings rate substantially through structural reforms. Half of China's gross savings are in the public sector. The government and state-owned enterprises should decrease revenue-raising and increase borrowing to finance investments. For example, China's high property prices are based on the investment-fund revenue needs of local governments. If China's property prices were cut by one-third, the national savings rate could decrease by two to three percentage points.



Third, the Chinese government could give its shares in listed state-owned enterprises to the household sector. The subsequent increase in household wealth could lower the national savings rate by three to four percentage points.



China's exports are down by roughly one-fifth. It needs the national savings rate to fall by about six percentage points for the economy to function normally. Otherwise, the economy will experience either a recession or a bubble. And the purpose of a bubble, as mentioned, would be to temporarily decrease the savings rate.

</blockquote>
 
[quote author="almon" date=1251639786]lending in this way is proof that the chinese thinking and the obama thinking are alike -> spend your way out of a depression. don't economists often remind us that the great depression was washed away not by the new deal but by world war two (think of ww2 as massive govt spending via war bonds and artificial inflated employment and you'll see the analogy).



put simply, there is no other option for the chinese govt: they simply have too many mouths to feed to take the other option (tighten credit, reduce debt as percentage of GDP and strengthen balance sheet). if the importing countries (USA being biggest) is tightening their belts, what else can china do other than stuff money in its population's pockets and hope to create an internal consumption market quickly? for their sake, it'd better grow REALLY quickly or hundreds of millions will be out of work and then the shit really hits the fan.</blockquote>


You are forgetting the option the US took, specifically: embargo the oil supply of a foreign nation until they have no choice but to attack, drawing you into a war you already know you can win.
 
<a href="http://pragcap.com/china-will-be-a-bigger-bubble-than-japan">CHINA WILL BE A BIGGER BUBBLE THAN JAPAN</a>



Superb analysis out of SocGen analysts this morning. Dylan Grice says the Chinese economy has many similarities to the Japanese economy before it imploded in the 90?s. He cites 8 reasons why the Chinese economy is likely to be an even larger implosion than the Japanese economy:



<em>Studying the lessons from Japan?s lost decade(s) is key for anyone seeking to understand today?s post-bubble world. But a closer reading of Japan?s financial history illuminates today?s China far more. In the early 1980s, on the eve of its financial liberalisation, Japan was the rising power from the East set to overtake the West. Younger and growing rapidly, it was still a decade away from its climactic and catastrophic bubble peak. This is where China is now.



* Japan?s deflationary experience since its bubble burst haunts policy makers and investors, who are confronted with a bewildering range of theories explaining what has gone wrong and how a similar scenario can or can?t be avoided.



* But the real cause of Japan?s deflation is probably more demographic than debt-related. If so, maybe we should be more worried about the side-effects of an ongoing stimulus overdose aimed at reviving the dead, rather than fighting a more ordinary bout of flu.



* Japan has been the first industrial economy to begin demographic contraction. Indeed, thanks to Deng Xiaoping?s 1979 one child policy, China will soon face the same problem.



* But it is unlikely China will suffer the same immediate fate. In fact, further reflection on the similarities between China and Japan leads one to realise that many of the challenges confronting China today have already been faced by Japan, demography being only one.



* From the strained currency diplomacy to the accusation of favouring exports over domestic demand, from the Western marvelling at Confucian capitalism to the sense of inevitability about the rising of a great power in the East ? all were as true for Japan 30 years ago as they are of China today.



* And Japan 30 or so years ago might be a more fruitful analogy altogether. There is a clear historic coincidence of manias and geopolitical shifts. In the 1980s, Japan?s developing financial bubble reflected a shifting of the balance of power in its direction.



* But the geopolitical shift towards China now underway dwarfs that seen in Japan in the 1980s, and probably anything yet seen in the history of the modern world. A commensurately seismic mania would lead to excesses beyond all proportion to the periodic bouts of frothiness seen so far.



* Japan?s experience also hints at what may be the future catalyst unleashing this frenzy: capital account liberalisation. Financial history is filled with financial liberalisations gone wrong and Japan?s bubble can be traced directly to the removal of controls on international capital flows and banking in the early 1980s. Seeking a larger international role for the renminbi, China is now, albeit tentatively, embarking on a similar path. Full liberalisation, when it occurs, could be the starting gun for the biggest bubble the world has ever seen.</em>



http://pragcap.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/socg.PNG
 
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